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Abstract: This article analyses the 2008 gubernatorial election in
Indonesia’s Maluku province and puts its result – a resounding vic-
tory for incumbent governor Karel Ralahalu – into the broader
context of the discourse on democracy in divided societies. Through
a detailed analysis of Ralahalu’s electoral strategy, the article illus-
trates how the incumbent used a combination of populism and
comprehensive networking with key organizational stakeholders
to secure an easy victory. The author also highlights the peaceful
conduct of the election and the overall significance of the fact that
key political, religious and ethno-regional actors seem to have ac-
cepted that democratic elections are now the only legitimate means
to distribute formal political power. In short, it is argued that de-
mocracy can indeed work in divided societies, especially if it is based
on institutional arrangements that promote cross-communal com-
munication and cooperation.
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Just about 10 years after the end of the New Order regime, Indonesia
has developed into one of South East Asia’s most stable electoral demo-
cracies. Despite occasional setbacks, the country has made consistent
1 The author would like to thank Marcus Mietzner, Gerry van Klinken, Jeroen Adam
and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this
paper. Many thanks are also extended to the University of Tasmania for funding two
research trips to Indonesia in 2008.
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progress towards democratic consolidation, as is evident in, amongst
other things, far-reaching institutional change, the abolition of the mili-
tary’s role in politics, the opening up of political space for a
burgeoning civil society and, of course, the regular conduct of free
and fair elections. Direct local elections [pemilihan kepala daerah,
pilkada]2 in particular have become a trademark characteristic of In-
donesia’s young democracy since their introduction in 2005, not least
because they have brought unprecedented levels of competition to
local politics (Buehler, 2007a; Buehler and Tan, 2007; Choi, 2007;
Erb and Sulistiyanto, 2009; Mietzner, 2008a; Vel, 2005, 2008). Al-
though the new electoral rules have done little to combat structural
problems such as elite domination and money politics,3 there can be
no doubt that the pilkada have enhanced public participation in poli-
tics as well as the overall accountability of governors, mayors and
district heads. As results from hundreds of local elections all over the
country have shown, voters have rarely hesitated to replace unpopu-
lar or corrupt officials when given the chance, while in other places
they have rewarded high-performing incumbents by re-electing them,
often with extraordinary results.
This article tells the tale of one such election, in which the incum-
bent governor succeeded in getting re-elected with a huge margin. As
the narrative unfolds, it will become clear that in some respects the
gubernatorial election in Maluku, one of Indonesia’s easternmost prov-
inces, was not much different from the multitude of other pilkada that
had previously been conducted in other regions. Indeed, as in so many
other places, the election in Maluku too was characterized by the domi-
nance of entrenched elites from the bureaucracy and big business, the
widespread distribution of money and patronage resources, and, with
one notable exception, the almost complete irrelevance of political parties
as effective vehicles for campaign support and voter mobilization. Never-
theless, despite these similarities with other local elections, the pilkada
2 Local elections take place at both the provincial and the district level. To differenti-
ate between the two administrative levels, gubernatorial elections are sometimes
called pilkada gubernur or pilgub. In Maluku, the election commission used yet
another acronym (pemilukada), but in this article the word pilkada will be used ge-
nerically for all local elections at the district and provincial level, including the
gubernatorial election in Maluku that is the main focus of this article.
3 On the contrary, it may be argued that in many regions these problems have been
perpetuated or even worsened since the introduction of direct elections. See Buehler
(2007b) for a good depiction of how local elites in South Sulawesi have captured the
political space by means of money politics and intimidation. See Hadiz (2004) for a
broader argument about the dominance of predatory interests in local politics.
Electoral democracy in Indonesia 231
in Maluku does stand out from the rest, if only because of the socio-
political environment in which it took place.
Maluku’s particular significance for analysing electoral processes
lies in its recent history of violent unrest. Between 1999 and 2002, the
province was the site of a protracted communal conflict between Chris-
tians and Muslims, which, according to conservative estimates, left at
least 2,000 people dead and more than 250,000 displaced from their
homes (van Klinken, 2007, p 88). At the time, some observers regarded
the brutal fighting as one of the most serious threats to Indonesia’s
national cohesion (Huxley, 2002, p 69), while others interpreted the
events, along with similar occurrences of collective violence in
Kalimantan and Sulawesi and the secessionist rebellions in Aceh and
Papua, as ‘signs that Indonesia may be facing at least partial disinte-
gration’ (Jane’s Intelligence Digest, 2001). Contextualized in the global
discourse about the so-called ‘third wave of democratization’
(Huntington, 1991), the events in Maluku and elsewhere appeared to
vindicate all those sceptics who claimed that democracy was not only
inappropriate, but actually dangerous for communally divided socie-
ties such as Indonesia.
A decade later, however, the critics have been proved wrong. Indo-
nesia has neither disintegrated nor relapsed into authoritarian rule. Instead
it has developed into a vibrant electoral democracy, which since 2006
has consistently been labelled as ‘free’ in the annual Freedom of the
World index. Significantly, the incremental institutionalization of for-
mal democratic rules and procedures over the last few years not only
strengthened civil liberties and political rights, but also facilitated the
end of communal violence in most conflict areas. Key political actors
who, during the initial uncertainty of the democratic transition, might
have regarded violence as a justifiable means to achieve political ends,
gradually began to accept that the only legitimate way to gain access to
power in the post-Suharto era was to contest free and fair elections.
This article uses the 2008 gubernatorial election in Maluku as a case
study to argue that democracy can indeed function in a divided society
and that elections can assist in paving the way for post-conflict recon-
ciliation. Following a brief background section about theoretical
approaches to democracy in divided societies and a concise recap of
the history of the Maluku conflict, the analysis proceeds to illustrate
how incumbent governor Karel Ralahalu used a combination of populism
and comprehensive networking with key organizational stakeholders
to secure an easy victory in the election. By applying this double-pronged
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strategy, Ralahalu demonstrated that he had adapted much better to the
new electoral rules than his opponents, who largely failed to engage
properly with their constituencies in the run-up to the poll. The deci-
siveness of Ralahalu’s victory, it is hoped, may now pave the way for
renewed efforts in reconstruction and reconciliation between the reli-
gious communities of the province. While a final judgment on Maluku’s
medium- to long-term prospects for political and social stability will
be possible only after the legislative election in 2009, it is fair to say
that the pilkada was a major step for Maluku on its path back to nor-
mality.
Democracy in divided societies: consociational v centripetal
models
John Stuart Mill (1958 [1861]) wrote that democracy was not a viable
solution for multi-ethnic societies because of what he perceived to be a
crucial lack of unity in public opinion. Some modern political analysts
concur with Mill’s critical assessment (Low, 1991; Rabushka and
Shepsle, 1972), but most observers today agree that democracy can
actually flourish in divided societies. In fact, democratization is widely
regarded as a tool to overcome or prevent violent conflict in such soci-
eties. This approach is based on the belief that democracy, in contrast
to authoritarian and totalitarian forms of government, provides institu-
tional channels to manage political conflicts peacefully (Reilly, 2001,
2006). What exact form these institutional channels should take in or-
der to exert their moderating influence most effectively, however, remains
the subject of controversy. While proponents of consociationalism ar-
gue that the best way to maintain peace is to acknowledge differences
and manage them through power-sharing arrangements within grand
coalitions (Lijphart, 1977, 1991), supporters of centripetal models in-
sist that differences should be devalued and eventually overcome by
providing institutional incentives for vote-pooling and the creation of
large centrist parties (Horowitz, 1985, 1991).
Electoral and party law reforms in Indonesia since 1999 have, as in
many other Asian countries, been driven largely by centripetal impera-
tives (Reilly, 2007). From the choice of the electoral systems for
parliamentary, presidential and local elections to requirements for the
establishment of political parties, Indonesia’s lawmakers have endeav-
oured to create a political system that provides incentives for parties
and candidates to appeal to broad, cross-communal constituencies
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According to Reilly (2009, p 10), ‘Indonesia’s current party rules are
[…] one of the most extreme versions of centripetal incentives to be
found anywhere in the world’. How these incentives have affected de-
velopments within the party system has recently been shown by Mietzner
(2008b), but despite the overall trend, it should be noted that the direc-
tion Indonesian politics is taking is not quite as linear as Reilly and
some other writers suggest. 
For instance, some of the centripetal regulations that were introduced
in recent years have proved rather ineffective, with the electoral threshold
probably the most prominent example. Between 1999 and 2004, the
effective number of parties in the House of Representatives did not
decrease, but increased (Tomsa, 2008, p 187), and hopes that small
parties might amalgamate if they failed to reach the threshold have
remained largely unfulfilled. Furthermore, efforts to devalue narrowly
defined communal identities through centripetal legislation have also
been undermined by the constant formation of new provinces and dis-
tricts in the wake of Indonesia’s comprehensive decentralization process.
Between 1998 and early 2007, almost 200 new districts were created
and, especially in recent years, the newly designed regions have often
been defined along ethnic or religious boundary lines. Unsurprisingly,
disputes about the creation of these districts have, in some cases, led to
communal tensions (International Crisis Group, 2005, 2007).
In light of the preceding discussion, it is clear that the exact format
of Indonesia’s democratic polity is still evolving. The general trend,
however, appears to signify a shift towards a ‘quasi-federal’ system
(Bertrand, 2007) in which some consociational elements are mixed with
other, somewhat more dominant, centripetal features. For Reilly (2006),
the strong influence of centripetal approaches in Indonesia forms part
of a region-wide trend, which, he argues, has brought about the emer-
gence of a distinct ‘Asian model of democracy’. Whether his model is
sustainable in Indonesia, however, may depend not so much on devel-
opments at the national level of politics, but rather on developments at
the local level, especially in eastern Indonesia, where the confluence
of ethnic and religious identity politics with a patrimonial style of power
distribution has proved to be explosive in the early days of the transi-
tion process.
It is therefore imperative that the democratic institutions crafted in
Jakarta address problems not only at the national level, but also at the
local level. So far, arguably the most important institutional tool the
Indonesian government has designed to try to steer local politics away
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from primordialism is the law that regulates the election of governors,
mayors and district heads. Drawing on the experience of the presiden-
tial election law, the Law on Local Government (Law 32/2004) also
features a number of centripetal requirements, including provisions that
candidates have to be nominated in pairs (that is, a candidate for gov-
ernor, mayor or district head must be nominated together with a running
mate for the deputy post) and that these pairs can only be nominated by
political parties that have reached a certain percentage of votes or seats
in parliament.4 These two passages in the law were clearly aimed at
reducing the number of candidates and, especially with regard to re-
gions with highly heterogeneous populations, at encouraging candidates
to form cross-ethnic pairs.
By the time the election in Maluku was drawing closer, these re-
quirements had already proved effective in a large number of provinces
and districts, including multi-ethnic regions such as Papua (Mietzner,
2007) or North Sumatra. Islamic parties frequently coalesced with na-
tionalist or even Christian parties during the nomination process,5 while
individual candidates often sought running mates from across religious
or ethnic dividing lines. But once again, a word of caution is necessary
as there were also signs that in some areas the legislation did not quite
produce the desired centripetal effects. In the former conflict province
of West Kalimantan, for example, three mixed Muslim–Christian pairs
were beaten by the only exclusively Christian pair contesting the poll
(Sinar Harapan, 2007); and in North Maluku, another area that had
been plagued by large-scale communal violence in the past (Wilson,
2008), the long-standing hostilities between the Makian and their eth-
nic rivals overshadowed the gubernatorial election in 2007, leading to
legal disputes and violent demonstrations (International Crisis Group,
2009).
4 In 2007, the Constitutional Court overturned this requirement and mandated that
independent candidates must also be allowed to run. Following this verdict, the In-
donesian parliament revised the law, but for the pilkada in Maluku, these revisions
came too late as there was insufficient time for the provincial election commission
to implement the changes. Consequently, all candidates in the Maluku poll were still
nominated by political parties or coalitions of parties.
5 Mietzner (2008b, p 451) quotes data from a non-government organization that cov-
ered local elections from 2005 until June 2007. According to these data, it was only
in 2.4% of the cases covered that Muslim parties had forged exclusive coalitions
with other Muslim parties.
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The Maluku conflict and its aftermath
Both of the above-mentioned examples may be regarded as exceptions
to an overall very positive trend, but they showed that ethnic sentiment
was still running high in some of Indonesia’s post-conflict areas. They
also showed that in some places elites were apparently still determined
to exploit these sentiments for their own political ends. In the run-up to
the pilkada in Maluku, the volatile situation in neighbouring North
Maluku in particular gave rise to concerns that the election in Maluku
might also reignite communal tensions. As in North Maluku, the vio-
lence that had gripped Maluku for more than four years (1999–2002)
had also been extremely fierce, with very high numbers of casualties.
Moreover, the fighting in Maluku was protracted, resulting in severe
and enduring socioeconomic problems after the conflict (Adam, 2008).
While details of Maluku’s communal conflict have been analysed elabo-
rately elsewhere (Aditjondro, 2001; International Crisis Group, 2002;
van Klinken, 2006; Toisuta et al, 2007), a very brief summary of the
events that led to widespread religious segregation in a province that is
almost evenly balanced between Christians and Muslims (see Table 1)
is imperative here to contextualize the 2008 pilkada properly in its
historical background.
It all began in January 1999, just a few months after the disintegra-
tion of Suharto’s New Order regime. Triggered by a seemingly trivial
altercation between youths from adjacent Christian and Muslim neigh-
bourhoods in Ambon City, the violence rapidly spread beyond the
confines of the provincial capital. The ferocity of the fighting, the em-
phasis on religious identities and symbols during the battles, and the
overall pattern of mobilization all suggested that this was not just an-
other brawl between rival youth gangs. Rather, as van Klinken (2007)
has convincingly argued, this violence carried strong notions of delib-
erate mobilization by people with significant political interests. Key
Table 1. Demographic structure of Maluku by religion (2000).
Urban Rural Total
Muslim 124,918 43.1% 439,117 51.1% 564,035 49.1%
Protestant 145,055 50.0% 343,576 40.0% 488,631 42.5%
Catholic 19,325 6.7% 69,252 8.1% 88,577 7.7%
Other 661 0.2% 7,995 0.9% 8,656 0.8%
Total 289,959 100.0% 859,940 100.0% 1,149,899 100.0%
Source: Brown, Wilson and Hadi (2005, p 9).
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actors within the respective religious communities, especially those
now actively involved in the newly emerging political landscape, ap-
parently regarded the breakdown of social order not only as a threat,
but also as an opportunity to (re)assert their authority over local poli-
tics (van Klinken, 2007, p 105). Violence, in this scenario, quickly
became politics by other means, orchestrated and directed by ration-
ally calculating actors who cared little about the human cost of the
fighting.
Whether these actors had indeed intended the bloodshed to turn into
the kind of civil war that eventually ensued is of course debatable.
Once the fighting was under way, new dynamics developed rapidly,
arguably beyond the control of those who had initially mobilized the
various combat groups. According to Brown, Wilson and Hadi (2005,
pp 33–36), there were at least three escalating factors that contributed
to the protraction of the conflict, namely the involvement of the secu-
rity forces and external militias, the dubious role of the media in
distributing (dis)information, and the growing desire for revenge against
the enemy. Largely due to these inauspicious dynamics, the violence
dragged on for several years (with various lulls in between) until in
February 2002, mediation efforts in the small town of Malino in South
Sulawesi at last resulted in a peace agreement.
The Malino Agreement put an end to the large-scale communal fight-
ing, but sporadic outbreaks of violence continued to threaten the fragile
peace. Several targeted bomb attacks as well as a series of sniper kill-
ings were among the most serious of these, and there were also a number
of localized fights between neighbouring villages on Ambon Island
and short-lived riots after the pilkada in Western South-East Maluku,
one of the provincial districts (The Jakarta Post, 2007). None of these
incidents, however, triggered renewed widespread communal conflict,
indicating that people from both religious communities were no longer
so easily provoked. From 2003 onwards, reconstruction and reconcili-
ation efforts got under way and over the years that followed, Maluku
gradually returned to normal.
The person who oversaw this recovery process was Karel Ralahalu.
A retired military officer with an untarnished reputation, Ralahalu rose
to the position of governor in August 2003 in a tightly contested indi-
rect election in Maluku’s regional parliament. Backed by the Indonesian
Democratic Party-Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan,
PDI-P) and sections of the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan
Pembangunan, PPP), Ralahalu and his running mate Muhammad
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Abdullah (Memet) Latuconsina won a narrow victory of 20:18 votes
against their Golkar-supported opponents Zeth Sahuburua and
Mohammad Taher Laetupa.6 Given his paper-thin majority, Ralahalu
initially seemed rather unlikely to become a powerful governor. But
over the next five years, the former brigadier-general, who had come
to office with little political experience, proved to be remarkably adept
on the political stage.
When Ralahalu began his first term, Maluku was still a province in
shock. Barely a year after the signing of the Malino Agreement, calm
had returned to Ambon and the surrounding islands, but the political,
economic and psychological scars of the conflict were still omnipres-
ent. Moreover, despite the peace deal, religious sentiment and social
tensions were still running extremely high. Accordingly, two major
themes dominated the political discourse in Maluku at the time of the
2003 election: security [keamanan] and balance [perimbangan] between
the religious groups. Ralahalu and his running mate Memet Latuconsina
were well positioned to address these issues, not only because they
represented both of the religious communities – Ralahalu is Protestant
and Latuconsina is Muslim – but also because Ralahalu, as a retired
military general who had come out of the conflict without being impli-
cated in any of the transgressions committed by the armed forces during
the fighting,7 seemed to symbolize hopes for a better and safer future.
In many ways, one may argue, he was the right man in the right place
at the right time.
6 Ralahalu’s victory came as a surprise because Sahuburua was jointly nominated by
Golkar and PPP, which together controlled 19 seats in the provincial parliament (Golkar
held 12 seats, PPP seven). Ralahalu, on the other hand, was only nominated by PDI-
P, which held 10 seats. With only the seats of the remaining three factions up for
grabs (five from the military/police faction and five each from two coalitions of
smaller parties), Golkar leaders were confident that Sahuburua would easily win the
election. In the end, however, the PPP faction split and several members gave their
vote to Ralahalu and his running mate Latuconsina, who after all was also a PPP
man. Six votes in the tumultuous election were declared invalid because the names
on the ballot papers were misspelled.
7 It is widely known that sections of the military played a rather dubious role during
the conflict. Rather than stopping the violence, members of the armed forces directly
contributed to the perpetuation of the conflict through deliberate negligence, the
provision of support to combatants, the instigation of violence and direct involve-
ment in combat (Azca, 2006, p 432). Ralahalu, however, was never implicated in
any of this, even though he was district military commander [Danrem] in Ambon at
the beginning of the conflict. He was later moved to Papua, where he remained until
his retirement in 2002.
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Consolidating power: how Ralahalu built his support base
Although the gradual restoration of security over the next few years
helped enhance Ralahalu’s popularity, there was much more to the new
governor than just the image of a strong military figure able to bring
back law and order. Indeed, for many Malukans, Ralahalu was a man
of the people. When asked about the governor’s main characteristics in
the run-up to the 2008 election, friends and foes alike almost unani-
mously described him as modest, friendly and down-to-earth.8 Maybe
the most obvious indicator of his humble attitude was his willingness
to travel extensively around the province and visit even the remotest
villages, some of which had never been visited by a provincial govern-
ment official before. Local journalists who accompanied the governor
on these trips reported that people literally cried when they saw him.9
What is interesting to note is that despite the obvious political calcu-
lations behind the visits, Ralahalu was also widely regarded as having
a genuine interest in the living conditions of the people in his province.
Ralahalu began his tours around the province as early as 2004, just
about a year after his rise to the post of governor. At this time, the next
election was still a long way off and the pilkada legislation that would
eventually pave the way for direct local elections from 2005 onwards
had not even been enacted. Thus, when Ralahalu started to show an
interest in communicating with ordinary people, he could not yet have
known for sure that at the end of his five-year term, this proximity to
the people (what Indonesians like to call merakyat) would actually
become a valuable asset in his campaign for re-election.10
Apart from direct contact with the people, Ralahalu also sought to
use organizational vehicles to boost his prestige. Arguably, the most
obvious of a number of initiatives in this regard was his entry into
party politics. In April 2007, local PDI-P icon John Mailoa suddenly
and unexpectedly passed away, leaving the position of provincial party
chairman vacant. Almost instantaneously, Ralahalu declared himself
ready to take over as caretaker leader, even though he had no organiza-
tional track record in the party. Just a short time afterwards, in October
2007, the party organized an extraordinary congress and, to the dis-
belief of a number of long-established local PDI-P politicians who
8 Author’s observation from various fieldwork trips in 2008.
9 Author’s personal communication with local journalists from Maluku, June 2008.
10 It should be noted, however, that his political instincts would certainly have told him
that direct elections were likely to be imminent for the local level after the presiden-
tial election in 2004 was conducted as a direct election for the first time ever.
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themselves had also eyed the chairmanship, Ralahalu was elected new
provincial chairman.
By assuming the PDI-P leadership, Ralahalu also strengthened his
bonds with Maluku’s biggest and best organized social organization,
the Protestant Church [Gereja Protestan Maluku, GPM], which has
long been closely affiliated with PDI-P. According to van Klinken (2007,
p 95), relations between the church and the party are so close that at the
time of the conflict there were hardly any PDI-P leaders in Maluku that
were not also involved in GPM. Today many organizational and indi-
vidual linkages between the two organizations continue to exist. Ralahalu
knew this – not least because his own wife was a minister – and thus he
effectively killed two birds with one stone when he became chairman
of the party’s provincial leadership board.
But Ralahalu was not content with having secured support from PDI-
P and, by implication, GPM. Well aware that Ambon was the only
town of any size in the province and that in many villages traditional
adat leaders were the most important political influence on people’s
lives, Ralahalu also sponsored a number of new organizations intended
to help him develop closer links with Maluku’s countless villages. One
such organization was the so-called Majelis Latupati, which was founded
in 2007 as an organization that brought together adat leaders from all
over Maluku in an open forum. Set up with the support of respected
NGO figure Ikhsan Malik, the Majelis Latupati was initially conceived
as an organization that would be used to reduce the potential for con-
flict between villages and to revive traditional adat mechanisms of
conflict resolution. Soon after its formation, however, the Majelis
Latupati was virtually captured by Ralahalu and his campaign team,
who saw it as a perfect opportunity for the incumbent governor to con-
nect regularly with influential local power holders and build new
patronage lines directly from the provincial down to the village level.
Thus, as prominent reconciliation activist and religious leader Abidin
Wakano observed, the Majelis Latupati quickly degenerated into little
less than a ‘tool for the powerful’.11
In addition to the Majelis Latupati, which has a broad reach over
Maluku, Ralahalu also sponsored the establishment and activities of
other, more locally and sometimes ethnically confined adat organiza-
tions (so-called paguyuban). In particular, he focused his attention on
the strategically important area of Ambon-Lease, which comprises the
11 Author’s interview with Abidin Wakano, NGO activist and member of the Indone-
sian Council of Ulema [Majelis Ulema Indonesia, MUI], 14 July 2008.
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four main islands of the Ambonese cultural heartland, namely Ambon
Island, Haruku, Saparua and Nusalaut. The special significance of these
islands can be traced back to the days of Dutch colonialism (Chauvel,
1990) and was reinforced throughout the New Order when key posi-
tions in the military and the bureaucracy were often allocated to members
of traditionally powerful families from those four islands. In particu-
lar, a small number of villages on Haruku, collectively known as
Hatuhaha, became the epicentre of power in Maluku during the New
Order. With the rise of Karel Ralahalu in 2003, however, the balance
had begun to shift towards the Leihitu and Salahutu areas on Ambon
Island (collectively known as Henahetu) as Ralahalu hails from the
village of Alang in the subdistrict of Leihitu.
The emerging rivalry was fuelled by the stark socio-demographic
differences between the two regions. While sparsely populated Hatuhaha
has long punched well above its weight in terms of political and eco-
nomic power, Henahetu is comparatively densely populated, but has
long had less political influence than Hatuhaha. Even when Ralahalu
ran for governor for the first time in 2003, he consciously took a run-
ning mate from Hatuhaha in order not to alienate powerful interests
from this area. In other words, he endeavoured to guarantee not only a
religious but also an ethno-regional balance. For the 2008 election,
however, he changed his strategy. Well aware of the changing electoral
dynamics precipitated by the replacement of indirect elections with the
pilkada regulation, he sought to mobilize more support at the grass
roots rather than simply to appease the Hatuhaha elites through power
sharing at the top. His vehicle of choice to reach out to voters was the
local adat organization. Thus, based on the calculation that winning
support from traditional local leaders at the grass roots would later
translate into broader support at the ballot box, he and his campaign
managers systematically approached key adat figures from Hatuhaha
and offered them better access to patronage resources.12
A final factor that shaped Ralahalu’s first term in office, and prob-
ably impacted positively on his growing popularity, was the fact that
Maluku experienced an enormous influx of reconstruction funds in the
aftermath of the conflict. National and international donors contributed
12 Significantly, Ralahalu used the same strategy in Henahetu, where he also sponsored
a local paguyuban to drum up support for his re-election bid. Given that this area is
basically his own back yard, his task there was substantially easier from the outset,
but the incumbent still left nothing to chance, as indicated by the appointment of
Ismael Titopela, a close ally of Ralahalu, to the chairmanship.
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huge amounts of money to Maluku, much of which was administered
directly by the provincial government. Most prominently, a special presi-
dential instruction issued in 2003 by then President Megawati
Sukarnoputri (Inpres 6) provided more than Rp4 trillion for reconstruc-
tion and reconciliation measures in line with the provisions of the Malino
Agreement. After initial administrative problems (Wilson, 2005), the
funds were eventually allocated over a three-year period between 2005
and 2007. Awash with money, Ralahalu easily endeared himself to many
segments of society, missing few opportunities to open newly estab-
lished churches, mosques and community centres.
Dents in the governor’s crown
Thus, Ralahalu had clearly become a well connected and fairly popu-
lar governor over the years. But not all that glittered was gold. Along
with the widening networks and the growing budget came new oppor-
tunities for nepotistic favouritism and the misappropriation of funds;
and while Ralahalu himself was never implicated in any corruption
scandals, several of his protégés in the bureaucracy did come under
anti-corruption scrutiny.13 The fact that none of these top bureaucrats
was held accountable for their alleged transgressions invited criticism
about Ralahalu’s commitment to the rule of law and, more generally,
about his selection of personnel. Few positions in the highest layers of
the bureaucracy had actually been filled according to merit or compe-
tence in 2003. Given the frequently expressed demand for a power
balance between Christians and Muslims after the conflict, religious
orientation appeared to be a more important consideration during the
staffing of the various government offices. Moreover, patron–client
connections determined many personnel decisions, as both Ralahalu
and his deputy governor were keen to ensure that supporters and friends
were rewarded for their loyalty. As a consequence, the capacity of the
bureaucracy to deal with the challenges of post-conflict reconstruction
and reconciliation was severely limited.
This became particularly evident in the debate over the distribution
of the reconstruction funds. Even though an enormous number of
13 The heads of at least three provincial government departments (Health, Social Af-
fairs and Information and Communication) were implicated in corruption scandals
during Ralahalu’s first term. The head of the Infokom department was eventually
arrested shortly after the election and officially declared a suspect in a corruption
case worth rupiah1.9 billion (Metro TV News.com, 2008).
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potential projects warranted government assistance, Ralahalu’s bureau-
crats failed to commit to enough projects by the time the money from
Inpres 6 had to be spent, leading to allegations of misappropriation and
corruption (detik.com, 2008). Critics also questioned the government’s
priorities. NGO activists in particular argued that Ralahalu had spent
far too much money on physical reconstruction rather than genuine
reconciliation between the religious groups. For example, no serious
efforts were made to prevent religious segregation in Ambon when
internally displaced people returned to the city after the conflict. Accord-
ing to Muslim intellectual Hasbollah Toisuta, it is this religious
segregation that poses the single biggest long-term threat to Maluku’s
recovery, mainly because it does not only happen in a physical sense,
but it also pervades people’s minds. Toisuta therefore has urged the
government to tackle this issue head-on and ‘help forge a new Maluku
identity that transcends religious bases’.14
In sum, by the time the 2008 election drew closer, the reconstruction
of post-conflict Maluku was well under way, but under the surface social
tensions and political problems continued to simmer. While most local
observers agreed that another eruption of widespread communal vio-
lence was highly unlikely, some activists argued that there was still a
possibility that especially young people who had been directly affected
by the previous conflict could again fall prey to demagogues and pro-
vocateurs who, it was feared, might resurface in the run-up to the election.
Indeed, religion and its potential for manipulation by political interests
was an omnipresent factor in many political discussions in the months
and weeks before the election. In order to help minimize the risk of
renewed conflict, leaders from the different religious communities
repeatedly issued joint statements, urging their followers not to be pro-
voked by external forces (Ambon Ekspres, 2008a and b).
From RASA to ASLI: introducing the candidates for the
2008 pilkada
When the election was eventually held, people had a choice between
four pairs of candidates, all of which were promoted to the public through
catchy acronyms (see Table 2). The first candidate to be confirmed
was incumbent Karel Ralahalu, who, unsurprisingly, was nominated
14 Author’s interview with Hasbollah Toisuta, NGO activist and Islamic intellectual, 5
July 2008.
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Table 2. Candidates in 2008 Maluku pilkada (following order on ballot paper).
Names of candidates Acronym Supporting Religious Regional
parties background background
Karel Ralahalu & RASA PDI-P, PBR, PDK, Protestant & Henahetu &
Said Assagaff PD, PPNUI, PKB, Muslim Henahetu
PKPI, PBB (family from
outside
Maluku)
Abdullah Tuasikal TULUS PKS, PAN, PPD, Muslim & Hatuhaha &
& Septinus Hematang PKPB Protestant Western South-
East Maluku
Asis Samual & ASLI PPP, PDS, Partai Muslim & Henahetu &
Lukas Uwuratuw Pelopor Protestant Western South-
East Maluku
Abdullah Latuconsina MADU Partai Golkar Muslim & Hatuhaha &
& Eduard Frans Protestant Western South-
East Maluku
by PDI-P.15 He was joined by Said Assagaff, a softly spoken yet capa-
ble career bureaucrat with a long history of service in various provincial
departments.16 Promoted with the acronym RASA [‘feeling’], the two
men combined the populist appeal of a benevolent father figure
(Ralahalu) with the administrative skills of a seasoned bureaucrat
(Assagaff) and thus neatly fitted the pattern of what Feith (1962) once
called the ‘solidarity makers’ and ‘administrators’. Moreover, they rep-
resented both religious communities, as Ralahalu was Protestant while
Assagaff was Muslim. As far as their ethno-regional backgrounds are
concerned, Ralahalu is from Leihitu on Ambon Island, whereas
Assagaff’s most important identification marker is his Arab lineage,
which, together with the fact that he is married to a woman from Sulawesi,
has helped him develop special bonds with some parts of Maluku’s
economically influential migrant community from Sulawesi (widely
known as BBM – Buginese, Butonese, Makassarese).17 Thus, Ralahalu
and Assagaff possessed not only highly complementary personal charac-
15 Later on, a large number of smaller parties joined PDI-P in declaring their support
for Ralahalu. In the end, a coalition of eight parties backed the incumbent, including
a number of Islamic parties such as PBB, PBR, PKB and PPNUI, which hoped – and
were hoped – to bring in some additional votes from the Islamic community.
16 By the time of the election, he held the position of provincial secretary, which is
usually regarded as the third most powerful position in the provincial government.
17 Just like local communities on the Lease Islands, the BBM community is also organ-
ized in various paguyuban, most prominently the so-called Kerukunan Keluarga
Sulawesi Selatan (KKSS), which has branches all over Maluku. And just like Ralahalu
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acteristics, but also highly complementary patronage networks. Add to
that the advantages of the incumbency and it was clear that RASA was
well positioned to contest this election.
The second aspirant to announce his candidature was the incumbent
deputy governor and provincial chairman of the Golkar Party,
Mohammad Abdullah (Memet) Latuconsina. Although he had formed
a fairly successful team with Ralahalu since 2003, Latuconsina appar-
ently declined an offer to become Ralahalu’s running mate once again.
Driven by his own ambitions and by growing demands from his party,
Latuconsina joined the race after a largely prearranged party conven-
tion in Golkar’s provincial headquarters. Despite the smooth nomination
process, however, his candidature was overshadowed by deep frictions
within the lower ranks of his party. These frictions had their roots in
the controversial circumstances under which Latuconsina had wrested
the party chairmanship from his predecessor Abdullah Tuasikal in 2006.18
At the time of the pilkada, many Golkar cadres were still loyal to Tuasikal
and refused to endorse Latuconsina’s bid for the governor post – espe-
cially after Tuasikal announced that he, too, would join the race (see
below). And even those party members who had initially supported
Latuconsina now expressed increasing doubts about their candidate’s
leadership qualities, particularly when he announced a largely unknown
intelligence officer as his running mate. In the eyes of many party cad-
res, the nomination of Eduard Frans was a major mistake, not only
because they were concerned that nominating an active intelligence
officer would harm the party’s overall reputation, but also because Frans
had spent most of his life outside Maluku and had practically no elec-
toral appeal.19 Given these less than favourable credentials, few observers
gave Latuconsina and Frans, who ran under the acronym MADU
[‘sweet’], a real chance to win the pilkada.
did with the adat organizations in Henahetu and Hahahutu, Assagaff too used the
KKSS and other ethnically defined adat groups to mobilize support for RASA’s
election campaign. See van Klinken (2008) for a detailed discussion of the role of
the KKSS in Indonesian politics.
18 Back in 2006, Golkar suffered various internal problems, which Abdullah Tuasikal
was apparently unable to solve. Latuconsina, who back then was still a member of
PPP, saw the turmoil as an opportunity to defect from PPP to Golkar, which he re-
garded as a more suitable organizational tool for his ambitions to run for governor in
2008. Offering direct access to the government’s lucrative patronage resources, he
lobbied enough district branch officials eventually to topple Tuasikal at an extraor-
dinary party congress. For more details on this episode, see Tomsa (2009, p 12).
19 Author’s interview with Fatani Sohilauw, member of DPRD Maluku, Partai Golkar,
1 July 2008.
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As indicated above, Latuconsina’s predecessor as Golkar leader,
Abdullah Tuasikal, did not let his ouster from the party chairmanship
stop him from pursuing his own power ambitions. True to his image as
a ‘bulldozer’ who would do whatever it took to achieve his goals, he
approached the Islamist Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan
Sejahtera, PKS), the third strongest party in Maluku at the time of the
pilkada, to secure his nomination. The manoeuvre left political ob-
servers somewhat bewildered because, just a year before the election,
Tuasikal had exchanged insults with PKS leaders after he had accused
the party of being radical and jihadist. But all that now seemed forgot-
ten, and despite the controversy, Tuasikal eventually received the nod
from PKS.20 The party justified the selection by claiming, somewhat
unconvincingly, that Tuasikal had promised to change,21 but most
observers believed that Tuasikal had simply bought his candidature by
direct lobbying of the PKS central leadership board in Jakarta.22
The fourth and final candidate to be announced was Asis Samual, a
relatively little known businessman from Liang (Ambon Island). Like
Tuasikal, Samual owed his nomination primarily to his generous financial
donations to the parties that nominated him and, at least in the case of
PPP, to chaotic internal dynamics within the party. Deeply divided over
the question of whether they should actually nominate a governor can-
didate at all, or support the incumbent governor and attempt to push
through a PPP-supported deputy governor candidate, the party leader-
ship made the decision that indeed a governor candidate should be
nominated only when the three most ambitious candidates had already
registered with other parties. In the end, Asis Samual appeared to be
the best (that is, the most generous) of the rest, but he was hardly a
serious contender.
A businessman and Golkar member by background, he had spent
much of his life in West Java and in Jakarta where he developed close
bonds with the family of former President Suharto. Obviously proud of
these bonds, Samual placed numerous advertisements in Maluku news-
papers in the weeks before the nomination process, showing him in
photos with Suharto’s daughter Tutut and other New Order figures.
20 In addition, three small parties (PAN, PPD and PKPB) joined PKS in supporting
Tuasikal.
21 Interview with Abdurrachman, member of PKS fraction in DPRD Maluku, 12 July
2008.
22 Estimates of the money he offered for the nomination ranged from rupiah8–12 bil-
lion, which was apparently much more than other potential candidates were willing
to pay.
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Apart from this relationship with the Cendana family, however, very
little is known about what exactly Asis Samual did during his time in
Jakarta. The one thing that was abundantly clear, however, was that he
had little political experience. In an effort to counter that weakness, he
chose Lukas Uwuratuw as his running mate, a seasoned Golkar politi-
cian and former deputy district head of Western South-East Maluku. In
his home district, he was widely known as the ‘oil king’ [raja minyak],
but in the rest of the province, he was, just like Eduard Frans and Abdullah
Tuasikal’s running mate Septinus Hematang, a largely unknown quan-
tity.
All in all, the candidate selection processes revealed a number of
important insights into Maluku’s local politics. On the one hand, they
reflected a highly familiar pattern of pragmatic opportunism and
money politics that had already been observed during numerous other
local elections in Indonesia (Buehler, 2007a; Buehler and Tan, 2007;
Choi, 2007). As elsewhere, for example, huge amounts of money had
to be generated by the candidates in order to seal their nominations
from the political parties, which in turn were determined to make the
most of their gatekeeping position by effectively auctioning off the
right to be nominated to the highest bidder. Another familiar phenom-
enon was that loyalty to a party usually played no role in the
nomination process. Most parties split into two or more factions, as
individual members and supporters often felt that their interests were
better accommodated by a candidate that was nominated by another
party. Defections and shifting loyalties were commonplace in the run-
up to the election, especially in Golkar, PPP, PAN and PKS.
Interestingly, however, PDI-P seemed to defy this trend. Despite
rumblings of dissatisfaction amongst some of the party’s longest serv-
ing local cadres, the party appeared remarkably solid behind its
candidate, and as the election would soon demonstrate, this solidity
was by no means insignificant.
Apart from these factors, which were in many respects little differ-
ent from other Indonesian regions, the nomination process also displayed
a number of trends that were somewhat particular to the Maluku con-
text. First, religion was an omnipresent though not always openly
expressed concern during the selection of candidates, thus imposing an
important structural constraint on all actors. In a political environment
in which balance between Christians and Muslims was perceived to be
paramount, all four candidates had no choice but to choose running
mates from ‘the other’ religion, whether they liked it or not. Yet, de-
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spite the promotion of all candidates as cross-religious pairs, it was
primarily the governor candidates (rather than their running mates) who
were recognized in the public perception. Accordingly, many locals
saw the election essentially as a contest between one Christian candi-
date and three Muslim candidates. In view of this public perception,
the legal provision that forced candidates to be nominated together with
a running mate appears to have been even more important. If ordinary
voters apparently still tended to see the pairs primarily through a reli-
gious lens, one can only speculate how the candidates would have
presented themselves if there had not been an institutional incentive to
reach out to the other community.
A similar argument can be put forward with regard to ethnicity (or
place of origin), which also strongly influenced the selection of candi-
dates. As mentioned before, politics in Maluku has long been dominated
by a small group of powerful families from the Lease Islands in central
Maluku. It was therefore of little surprise that all four governor candi-
dates were indeed from this area. In contrast to previous years, however,
when the power struggle had taken place behind firmly closed doors,
this first ever pilkada now forced the candidates to look for running
mates who promised to be able to mobilize broader support in regions
outside the Lease Islands. For three out of four candidates, this impera-
tive resulted in the selection of a running mate from the fairly populous
yet politically rather marginalized Western South-East Maluku region.
Only Karel Ralahalu opted for a different approach, although he too
chose a deputy candidate who would appeal to a different ethnic group
(the BBM migrants).
Here the power of the electoral institutions to shape the behaviour of
political actors became abundantly clear. Driven by the belief that people
in Western South-East Maluku would almost habitually vote along pri-
mordial lines, Latuconsina, Tuasikal and Samual all chose deputy
candidates from this region, simply because the demographics suggested
that a large number of votes were to be won there. That none of the
candidates who offered themselves for nomination as deputy gover-
nors actually had broader electoral appeal seemed to be lost on the
three governor hopefuls and their advisers. Ironically then, the laws
fulfilled their function of promoting cross-communal cooperation and
communication, but in interpreting the letter rather than the spirit of
the law, the three candidates did not really enhance their chances for
election.
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The campaign
The time between the announcements of the teams and the beginning
of the official election campaign was characterized by the candidates’
frenzied efforts to assemble effective campaign teams. Incumbent gov-
ernor Karel Ralahalu had a distinct advantage in this race for financial
and material support, not only because he possessed the most compre-
hensive patronage networks, but also because he was the first contender
to be officially confirmed as a candidate. While the other potential
candidates were still busy outbidding each other in their quest for an
organizational vehicle, Ralahalu had long secured his nomination from
PDI-P and was already actively involved in courting key stakeholders
from his various political, religious and economic networks. By the
time the campaign eventually got under way, thousands of RASA post-
ers and stickers all over the province were reinforcing the impression
of Ralahalu’s dominance. Of the other three contenders, only Abdullah
Tuasikal seemed reasonably determined to take on the incumbent in
this poster war, but compared with the RASA onslaught, even Tuasikal’s
efforts looked rather pathetic.
Overall, in fact, the official campaign was a rather muted affair. Al-
though some incidences of intimidation and ‘black’ campaigning were
reported in the media (Suara Maluku, 2008a; Ambon Ekspres, 2008c
and d; Mimbar Maluku, 2008),23 the overall atmosphere was peaceful
and the general mood between the contenders almost amicable. This
was epitomized in a public debate between the candidates that was
broadcast live on TVRI Maluku a few days before the election. Largely
void of political content, the debate was laden with platitudes, prompt-
ing one observer to liken the event to the popular reality show Indonesian
Idol rather than a political debate (Suara Maluku, 2008b).
It was only in the last two days of the campaign that it finally came to life,
at least in the city of Ambon, where all four candidate pairs were scheduled
to hold large rallies. A common feature of any election in Indonesia, these
rallies usually reveal relatively little about the real levels of support for a
candidate, but in this particular pilkada they were actually a remarkably
accurate reflection of the popularity of the individual contenders. Whilst
MADU and ASLI struggled to fill at least half of the local football field,
TULUS attracted a fairly decent crowd. By far the biggest number of
23 In the context of Indonesian elections, the term ‘black campaign’ refers to attempts
to bring certain candidates into disrepute, usually through the spreading of rumours
and the distribution of false statements and manipulated images.
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people, however, turned up to the rally held by RASA (Suara Maluku,
2008c). Braving incessant rain and knee-deep puddles on the half-flooded
pitch, thousands turned up to see Ralahalu and his main guest speaker,
PDI-P chairman Megawati Sukarnoputri.
This rally demonstrated once more why Karel Ralahalu was about to
enter election day as the red-hot favourite. Significantly, and in con-
trast to the other contenders, Ralahalu actually succeeded in transforming
his rally into what it was intended to be – a colourful show of force.
While the other three candidates struggled to mobilize sizeable crowds,
the RASA rally did live up to its promise of turning the football field
into a sea of red. Ralahalu could probably have achieved this success
even without luring a star attraction of Megawati’s calibre to Ambon.
Well attended rallies in smaller towns and villages indicated that Ralahalu
himself was a major drawcard for the masses. However, the presence
of the hugely popular Megawati,24 who eagerly jumped on the oppor-
tunity to campaign for her own presidential candidature in 2009, was a
personal coup for the governor because it seemed to indicate that Karel
Ralahalu was so influential in PDI-P circles that his voice was actually
heard at the highest level of the party hierarchy in Jakarta. In a prov-
ince such as Maluku, which had felt neglected by Jakarta for decades,
this was a factor that was not to be underestimated.25
The election, the result and the reasons behind the result
The campaign ended on 5 July and, after a three-day lull, the election
was finally held on 9 July 2008. Initial estimates had voter turnout at
85%, and even though this figure was later downgraded slightly, elec-
toral participation in this pilkada was much higher than in most other
gubernatorial elections.26 The high turnout showed that Malukans were
24 Back in 2004, Maluku had been one of the few provinces in which Megawati won
against Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in the second round of the presidential election
(she came in second in the first round after Wiranto).
25 While Megawati lent her support to Ralahalu, no prominent Golkar leaders followed
an invitation to Maluku. Although several names circulated in the press before MADU’s
final rally, the party elite eventually snubbed Latuconsina and preferred to gather in
Bali to show their support to their candidate in that province’s pilkada, which was
held on the same day as the election in Maluku.
26 According to survey data quoted by Fatah (2007), the average turnout in gubernato-
rial elections between 2005 and 2007 was around 65%. More recent elections held in
2008 in East Kalimantan (68%), Central and East Java (55 and 59%), Lampung
(69%), Riau (59%) and South Sumatra (74%) have all confirmed the fact that the
turnout in Maluku was remarkably high (all 2008 turnout data from Website: http://
www.lsi.or.id, accessed 18 January 2009).
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Table 3. Final result of the 2008 pilkada in Maluku.
Candidate Number of votes Number of votes
(absolute) (percentage)
Ralahalu–Assagaff (RASA) 452,711 62.14
Tuasikal–Hematang (TULUS) 192,112 26.37
Latuconsina–Frans (MADU) 44,700 6.14
Samual–Uwuratuw (ASLI) 38,998 5.35
Source: Kompas.com (2008a).
eager to have their say and, as had been widely expected, most came
out in support of Karel Ralahalu (See Table 3).
The impressive figures were evidence that Ralahalu’s electoral strat-
egy had been planned and executed to near perfection. There can indeed
be little doubt that at the time of the election Ralahalu was a very popu-
lar leader. By restoring a sense of security, he had successfully addressed
the province’s most pressing problem of the last five years. Perhaps
equally important though, he not only delivered this most basic of needs
but, supported by a professional consultancy from Jakarta,27 he also
proved highly adept at selling this success during his image-building
campaign. This campaign took him to some of the remotest places in
the province, including islands that had never before been visited by a
provincial government official. It was in these places in particular that
Ralahalu easily secured mass support by presenting himself as a be-
nevolent leader who took a genuine interest in the fate of his constituents.
In the run-up to the election, the governor and his campaign team mas-
terfully exploited this image as they highlighted Ralahalu’s proximity
to the people and his experience as a proven leader.28
How broad and widespread his appeal indeed was by the time of the
election could be seen when the pollsters from LSI released their data
on the distribution of votes along selected demographic indicators. As
shown in Table 4, Ralahalu and his running mate Said Assagaff not
only received the majority of votes from people of (almost) all age and
income groups, but also from all districts and municipalities. Similarly,
27 Like many other local politicians all over the country, Ralahalu had used the serv-
ices of a well known professional consultancy firm to sharpen his profile and promote
his campaign. Incidentally, this consultancy was the same company that also con-
ducted the quick count on election day (Lingkaran Survei Indonesia, LSI), which
prompted some challengers to question the accuracy of the quick count. As it turned
out, however, the margin of error in the quick count was negligible.
28 One of the campaign slogans of RASA was ‘Bukan Janji, Tapi Bukti’ (Not [just]
Promises, but Proof), which directly referred to Ralahalu’s track record as governor.
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Table 4. Distribution of votes along demographic indicators (%).
Ralahalu– Tuasikal– Latuconsina– Samual–
Assagaff Hematang Frans Uwuratuw
(RASA) (TULUS) (MADU) (ASLI)
Age
19 or under 40.9 45.5 9.1 4.5
20–29 51.6 37.6 3.2 7.5
30–39 59.8 28.4 2.0 9.8
40–49 64.3 24.3 8.6 2.9
50 and above 63.8 27.5 5.8 2.9
Income
Less than Rp 400,000 60.9 32.3 3.2 3.6
per month
Rp 400,000–999,999 53.5 31.0 2.8 12.7
per month
Rp 1 million or more 57.4 24.1 13.0 5.6
District
Ambon 73.94 16.24 6.41 3.41
Buru 63.69 26.22 4.68 5.41
Aru and South-East Maluku 69.30 22.93 3.55 4.23
Central Maluku and 50.49 38.38 4.84 6.28
East Seram
Western South-East Maluku 55.70 9.65 11.34 23.32
West Seram 65.08 23.14 9.14 2.64
Sex
Male 57.8 30.6 4.4 7.2
Female 58.5 31.3 5.1 5.1
Urban/rural
Urban 63.7 22.5 6.9 6.9
Rural 55.9 34.3 3.9 5.9
Source: Adapted from LSI (2008).
RASA secured almost equally overwhelming support from both men
and women and from people living in both urban and rural areas.
But popularity alone does not account for these impressive figures.
On the contrary, Ralahalu’s immense support from key organizational
stakeholders including political parties, religious and ethno-regional
organizations as well as economic interest groups was perhaps even
more important. Support from these groups was established through
complex patron–client relations and, unlike in Java, where the impact
of patron–clientelism on voting behaviour seems to be in decline,29 the
29 Several studies on recent Indonesian elections have shown that while patron–
clientelism may persist in Java as well, voting behaviour on Indonesia’s most populous
island seems more determined by the two axial trends of enduring aliran structures
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prevalence of such clientelistic structures continues to play a huge role
in determining electoral choices in eastern Indonesia, including Maluku.
The significance of patronage and its utilization through communal
organizations in Indonesia’s outer islands has been highlighted by van
Klinken (2007, 2008, 2009), who observed that ‘[t]he most striking
feature of provincial town life is […] vigorous organisational life, which
combines themes of “traditional” family-like ethnic or religious com-
munity with modern techniques of mobilisation and a great interest in
capturing the institutions of the state’ (van Klinken, 2009). As the big-
gest Indonesian town east of Makassar, Ambon is certainly no exception
to this phenomenon and, after five years at the top of the government,
Karel Ralahalu was no doubt highly conscious of the importance of the
plethora of political, economic, religious and ethnic organizations op-
erating in and around Ambon. In order to take full advantage of their
existence – and their potential to mobilize voters – Ralahalu showed
little hesitation in playing the incumbency card.
Indeed, the governor had always laid great emphasis on the develop-
ment of close linkages with a number of influential non-governmental
organizations. This clientelistic dimension of Ralahalu’s leadership style
had been evident since the very early days in 2003,30 but it seems that
it was only after his rise to the provincial PDI-P chairmanship that he
actually embarked on a systematic campaign to build ever wider pa-
tronage networks. The most important pillars of this emerging web of
pro-Ralahalu groups were a number of political parties (chiefly PDI-P,
but also some smaller parties), the Protestant Church and many of the
adat-inspired paguyuban from Ambon Island and central Maluku. With
the backing of these crucial power brokers, the incumbent could be
reasonably well assured that the image he had built over the years would
be incessantly reinforced at the grass roots through countless speeches
and sermons given at party meetings, church services and community
gatherings.
The effort to get these groups on board paid off handsomely on the
day of the election. In a rare show of party solidity, for example, PDI-P
mobilized nearly its entire pool of members and supporters to vote
on the one hand and increasingly rational decision making amongst voters on the
other hand (Aspinall, 2005; Ufen, 2008).
30 On taking up the post of governor in 2003, he appointed a number of close confi-
dants to important positions in the bureaucracy, despite questions about their
qualifications. Favouritism was also alleged in Ralahalu’s handling of the distribu-
tion of reconstruction funds from Inpres 6, even though it should be stressed here
that no evidence is available to prove this.
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almost unanimously for Ralahalu.31 One of Ralahalu’s key campaign
strategists, provincial party secretary Lucky Wattimury, later singled
out the great work of the party’s campaign team as one of the main
reasons why Ralahalu was able to achieve such an extraordinary re-
sult.32 Thus, in the broader context of local politics in Indonesia, one
may argue that PDI-P in Maluku became the exception that proved the
rule. In contrast to the countless other cases in which weak and frag-
mented party organizations had neither the capacity nor the motivation
actually to support their candidates, PDI-P in Maluku showed that where
local organizational structures are strong and coherent, a political party
can actually be a very useful tool for campaign support and voter mo-
bilization.
In addition to solid PDI-P support, the GPM connection proved cru-
cial for Ralahalu. No less than 83% of all Christians in Maluku voted
for the incumbent (LSI, 2008), confirming the impression that many
voters perceived the election primarily as a contest between one Chris-
tian and three Muslim candidates. Significantly, GPM was widely
believed to have played a highly strategic role in creating and continu-
ously reinforcing this perception through its far-reaching network of
churches at the grass roots. And even though GPM leader John
Ruhulessin insisted that there were no formal instructions for GPM
members to vote for Ralahalu, he also noted that such an instruction
would not have been necessary anyway. ‘They do not need instruc-
tions, they already know whom they should vote for’, he said with a
broad grin,33 indicating that the traditional bond between GPM and
PDI-P (and by implication, Ralahalu) was still very much intact. The
third pillar of Ralahalu’s organizational support base comprised the
increasingly influential adat groups, especially those from Ralahalu’s
home turf on Ambon Island. Although their direct influence on voting
behaviour is difficult to quantify, anecdotal evidence suggests that
encouragement and subtle pressure from these adat leaders did occur
in the run-up to the election, and that these measures helped Ralahalu
secure the extraordinary average of more than 80% of the votes in areas
such as Ambon Island and Saparua (LSI, 2008).
Finally, another factor that explains Ralahalu’s decisive victory was
31 According to the quick count results, 96.7% of PDI-P supporters voted for Ralahalu
(LSI, 2008).
32 Author’s interview with Lucky Wattimury, speaker of the municipal parliament in
Ambon, and leader of Ralahalu’s campaign team, 16 July 2008.
33 Author’s interview with John Ruhulessin, Chairman of GPM, 4 July 2008.
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the overall weakness of his three opponents. Neither Memet Latuconsina
nor Abdullah Tuasikal nor Asis Samual possessed significant popular
appeal or organizational support. What is arguably even more note-
worthy, however, is that none of these candidates even tried particularly
hard to gain either of those two key assets. Approaching the election in
the misguided belief that primordial sentiment and the support from
political parties would mobilize an electorate that was apparently still
perceived to be largely immature and irrational, they revealed a seri-
ous lack of understanding of what is needed to compete in local elections
these days. Memet Latuconsina epitomized this antiquated vision of
politics. When he replaced Abdullah Tuasikal as chairman of Golkar’s
provincial branch in 2006, he seemed to believe that the former regime
party’s organizational apparatus would instantly accept him and work
for him. Numerous elections in recent years, however, have shown that
Golkar’s once notoriously effective party machine has lost much, if
not all of its former prowess.34 Unsurprisingly then, by the time of the
election, the party actually did very little to support its candidate. An-
other indicator that Latuconsina was trying to transplant outdated New
Order ideas into the election was his justification for choosing Eduard
Frans as his running mate. Alleging that all military men are held in
high esteem in Maluku and that the people need a firm hand to guide
them,35 Latuconsina gave the impression of an old-style career bureau-
crat who underwent his political socialization in the New Order and
who has been unable to adapt to the changing times in Indonesia.
Conclusion
Karel Ralahalu won Maluku’s first ever direct gubernatorial election
by a huge margin. He was sworn in by Indonesia’s Minister for Home
Affairs Mardiyanto on 15 September 2008 (Kompas.com, 2008b), en-
dowed with an unprecedented mandate to shape the future trajectory of
the province. As this article has shown, Ralahalu’s resounding victory
was a result of a combination of populism and the incumbent’s astute
instrumentalization of powerful patronage networks. By relying on these
two factors as the key pillars of his campaign strategy, the old and new
governor demonstrated that he, in contrast to his rivals, fully under-
stood what it takes to win local elections in contemporary Indonesia.
34 See Buehler (2007a) for evidence from South Sulawesi, or Tomsa (2006) for evi-
dence from the 2004 presidential election.
35 Author’s interview with Memet Latuconsina, 1 July 2008.
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First, the nature of the electoral institutions for local elections has
led to an increasing emphasis on personalistic populism, which requires
candidates to engage increasingly more directly with their constituen-
cies. Extensive campaigning at the grass roots, often beginning several
years before an election, is a must in order for candidates to establish a
well constructed image for voters. Especially in a province such as
Maluku, with its far-flung archipelagic geography and poorly devel-
oped infrastructure, candidates run the risk of low name recognition if
they do not travel around the province. Ralahalu knew that and spent
much of his time visiting remote communities, consistently cementing
his image as a governor who cared about his people. Second, candi-
dates need to be able to build effective patronage networks in order to
engage successfully with influential community stakeholders. This may
sound straightforward, but given the complexity of organizational life
in many Indonesian towns, great tactical deftness is often needed to
identify which groups will really be beneficial in an electoral cam-
paign.36 As van Klinken (2008) has shown, ethnic clientelism has its
limits, and even the biggest paguyuban may not always help a candi-
date’s cause. In Maluku, Ralahalu’s assessment of community life in
his province turned out to be very accurate and he used it to his advan-
tage.
With the pilkada now history, Malukans have turned their attention
to the 2009 legislative election [pemilihan umum, pemilu]. Indeed, many
of the political manoeuvres during the pilkada, such as, for example,
the PPP’s decision eventually to nominate its own gubernatorial candi-
date, or of so many small parties jumping on the bandwagon with Karel
Ralahalu, were obviously conducted with a view to the upcoming re-
distribution of parliamentary seats. Therefore, it is probably fair to say
that a final judgment on Maluku’s medium- to long-term prospects for
political and social stability will only be possible after the legislative
election in 2009. However, the orderly conduct of the pilkada was an
important step for the province and it gives good reason to hope that
the pemilu will proceed just as peacefully.
What the pilkada demonstrated more broadly was that Indonesia’s
electoral institutions have proved very effective in the communally
charged environment of a post-conflict area. Most prominently, the legal
36 To illustrate the point, Latuconsina secured the support of the military-affiliated lobby
organization Communication Forum of the Sons and Daughters of Indonesian Veter-
ans [Forum Komunikasi Putra-Putri Indonesia, FKPPI], a rather insignificant actor
in the overall picture of Maluku’s organizational landscape.
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requirement for gubernatorial candidates to run in pairs with a nomi-
nee for deputy governor ensured invaluable levels of cross-ethnic
communication and cooperation at the elite level. Although most vot-
ers apparently took little notice of the deputy candidates, the
discouragement of ethnic exclusivism at the elite level significantly
reduced the potential for the electoral process to be hijacked by radical
demagogues. Following on from this, it is important to emphasize that
the democratic procedures introduced over the last few years are ap-
parently now widely accepted as the only legitimate means to gain
political power. All the key players showed that they were willing to
play by the rules and to desist from using non-democratic means. In
the few instances when episodes of thuggery or intimidation did occur,
they were either condemned immediately or simply ignored so that
they could not be exploited to stir up tensions in the wider commu-
nity.37 Equally important, all candidates readily accepted the result,
although it should be noted that the clarity of Ralahalu’s victory prob-
ably helped to prevent any kind of post-election dispute. Last but not
least, the voters for their part showed their support for democratic elec-
tions by flocking to the polling booths in huge numbers. The high turnout
was clear evidence that people were determined to have their say and
to express their endorsement of the incumbent governor.
Maluku’s local democracy may be neither consolidated nor of par-
ticularly high quality at this stage. There is no doubt that politics in
this former conflict area now revolves around populism and patronage
rather than policies and programmes. In the years to come, the govern-
ment will need to work very hard indeed if it is to deliver improved
standards of living for the people of Maluku.38 But at the most basic
level, the new democratic institutions have brought enhanced levels of
vertical accountability, and they provide critically important channels
for the peaceful contestation for power. Ten years after the fall of Suharto
and three years after the first ever direct local election in Indonesia, the
rules that regulate these channels are still somewhat in a state of flux,
but they are becoming increasingly institutionalized and their power to
shape the behaviour of political actors could readily be observed in the
pilkada in Maluku. In light of what happened in this region during the
37 According to the International Crisis Group (2009, p 9), similar elite behaviour was
also observed in the much more controversial pilkada in North Maluku, where elites
also acted decisively to prevent smaller incidents of violence from spreading.
38 See Tomsa (2009) for a discussion of some of the challenges Ralahalu faces in his
second term.
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time when there were no institutionalized rules, this conclusion is a
very positive sign indeed.
References
Adam, J. (2008), ‘Downward social mobility, prestige and the informal economy in post-
conflict Ambon’, South East Asia Research, Vol 16, No 3, pp 461–479.
Aditjondro, G. (2001), ‘Guns, pamphlets and handie-talkies: how the military exploited
local ethno-religious tensions in Maluku to preserve their political and economic
privileges’, in Wessel, I., and Wimhoefer, G., eds, Violence in Indonesia, Abera Verlag,
Hamburg, pp 100–128.
Ambon Ekspres (2008a), ‘Berharap Masyarakat tak Diprovokasi’, 30 June.
Ambon Ekspres (2008b), ‘Tokoh Agama Lahirkan 7 Kesepakatan Pemilukada Damai’, 4
July.
Ambon Ekspres (2008c), ‘Pengawasan Lemah, Banyak PNS Terlibat Tisu’, 30 June.
Ambon Ekspres (2008d), ‘20 PNS Terlibat Tisu Dilaporkan ke Panwas’, 4 July.
Aspinall, E. (2005), ‘Elections and the normalization of politics in Indonesia’, South
East Asia Research, Vol 13, No 2, pp 117–156.
Azca, M. N. (2006), ‘In between military and militia: the dynamics of the security forces
in the communal conflict in Ambon’, Asian Journal of Social Sciences, Vol 34, No 3,
pp 431–455.
Bertrand, J. (2007), ‘Indonesia’s quasi-federalist approach: accommodation amid strong
integrationist tendencies’, International Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol 5, No 4,
pp 576–605.
Brown, G., Wilson. C., and Hadi Suprayoga (2005), Overcoming Violent Conflict: Vol-
ume 4, Peace and Development Analysis in Maluku and North Maluku, United Nations
Development Programme, Jakarta.
Buehler, M. (2007a), ‘Local elite reconfiguration in post-New Order Indonesia: the 2005
election of district government heads in South Sulawesi’, Review of Indonesian and
Malaysian Affairs, Vol 41, No 1, pp 119–147.
Buehler, M. (2007b), ‘Rise of the clans’, Inside Indonesia, Vol 90 (October–December).
Buehler, M., and Tan, P. (2007), ‘Party-candidate relationships in Indonesian local poli-
tics: a case study of the 2005 regional elections in Gowa, South Sulawesi province’,
Indonesia, No 84 (October), pp 41–69.
Chauvel, R. (1990), Nationalists, Soldiers and Separatists: The Ambonese Islands from
Colonialism to Revolt 1880–1950, KITLV Press, Leiden.
Choi, N. (2007), ‘Elections, parties and elites in Indonesia’s local politics’, South East
Asia Research, Vol 15, No 3, pp 325–354.
detik.com (2008), ‘Penegak Hukum Didesak Usut Korupsi Dana Inpres di Maluku’, 25
August, available from Website: http://new.detiknews.com/read/2008/08/25/223025/
994422/10/penegak-hukum-didesak-usut-korupsi-dana-inpres-di-maluku (accessed 19
January 2009).
Erb, M., and Sulistiyanto, P., eds (2009), Deepening Democracy in Indonesian? Direct
Elections for Local Leaders (Pilkada), Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.
Fatah, E. S. (2007), ‘Mengelola Golput Jakarta’, Kompas, 24 July.
Feith, H. (1962), The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, Cornell Uni-
versity Press, Ithaca, NY.
Hadiz, V. (2004), ‘Indonesian local party politics: a site of resistance to neoliberal re-
form’, Critical Asian Studies, Vol 36, No 4, pp 615–636.
Horowitz, D. L. (1985), Ethnic Groups in Conflict, University of California Press, Berkeley,
CA.
258 South East Asia Research
Horowitz, D. L. (1991), A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a
Divided Society, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA.
Huntington, S. P. (1991), The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Cen-
tury, Oklahoma University Press, Norman, OK, and London.
Huxley, T. (2002), Disintegrating Indonesia? Implications for Regional Security, Adelphi
Paper, Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies,
Oxford.
International Crisis Group (2002), Indonesia: The Search for Peace in Maluku, Asia
Report No 31, ICG, Brussels and Jakarta.
International Crisis Group (2005), Decentralisation and Conflict in Indonesia: The Mamasa
Case, Asia Briefing No 37, ICG, Brussels and Jakarta.
International Crisis Group (2007), Indonesia: Decentralisation and Local Power Strug-
gles in Maluku, Asia Briefing No 64, ICG, Brussels and Jakarta.
International Crisis Group (2009), Local Election Disputes in Indonesia: The Case of
North Maluku, Asia Briefing No 86, ICG, Brussels and Jakarta.
Jane’s Intelligence Digest (2001), ‘Will Indonesia disintegrate?’ briefing, 26 April.
Kompas.com (2008a), ‘Ralahalu–Assagaff Pemenang Pilkada Maluku’, 24 July, avail-
able from Website: http://www.kompas.com/read/xml/2008/07/24/12311310/
ralahalu-assagaff.pemenang.pilkada.maluku (accessed 4 October 2008).
Kompas.com (2008b), ‘Mendagri Lantik Karel Ralahalu Jadi Gubernur Maluku’, 15 Sep-
tember, available from Website: http://www.kompas.com/read/xml/2008/09/15/
14142014/mendagri.lantik.karel.ralahalu.jadi.gubernur.maluku (accessed 30 September
2008).
Lingkaran Survei Indonesia (LSI) with Jaringan Isu Publik (2008), ‘Quick Count Pilkada
Provinsi Maluku’, presentation given in Ambon, 9 July.
Lijphart, A. (1977), Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration, Yale
University Press, New Haven, CT.
Lijphart, A. (1991), ‘The power-sharing approach’, in Montville, J. V., ed, Conflict and
Peacemaking in Multi-Ethnic Societies, Lexington Books, New York, pp 491–509.
Low, D. A. (1991), Eclipse of Empire, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Metro TV News.com (2008), ‘Dua Pejabat di Maluku Masuk Bui’, 28 July, available
from Website: http://202.158.49.22/berita.asp?id=63438 (accessed 25 September 2008).
Mietzner, M. (2007), ‘Local elections and autonomy in Papua and Aceh: mitigating or
fueling secessionism?’ Indonesia, No 84 (October), pp 1–39.
Mietzner, M. (2008a), ‘Indonesia and the pitfalls of low-quality democracy: a case study
of the gubernatorial election in North Sulawesi’, in Buente, M., and Ufen, A., eds,
Democratization in Post-Suharto Indonesia, Routledge, London and New York, pp
124–149.
Mietzner, M. (2008b), ‘Comparing Indonesia’s party systems of the 1950s and the post-
Suharto era: from centrifugal to centripetal inter-party competition’, Journal of
Southeast Asian Studies, Vol 39, No 3, pp 431–453.
Mill, J. S. (1958 [1861]), Considerations on Representative Government, Liberal Arts
Press, New York.
Mimbar Maluku (2008), ‘Tim TULUS Lapor RASA ke Panwas’, 5 July.
Rabushka, A., and Shepsle, K. A. (1972), Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Demo-
cratic Instability, Merrill, Columbus, OH.
Reilly, B. (2001), Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict
Management, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Reilly, B. (2006), Democracy and Diversity: Political Engineering in the Asia–Pacific,
Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Reilly, B. (2007), ‘Electoral and political party reform’, in McLeod, R. H., and MacIntyre,
A., eds, Indonesia: Democracy and the Promise of Good Governance, Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, pp 41–54.
Electoral democracy in Indonesia 259
Reilly, B. (2009), ‘Political reform and the demise of consociationalism in Southeast
Asia’, paper presented to the Conference on Challenges and Prospects of Demo-
cratic Governance in Southeast Asia, 15–17 January, Heidelberg.
Sinar Harapan (2007), ‘Politik Agama Penyebab “Incumbent” Tumbang di Pilgub Kalbar’,
27 November.
Suara Maluku (2008a), ‘Tim Rasa Selidiki Keterlibatan PNS Malteng Dalam Pilkada’,
28 June.
Suara Maluku (2008b), ‘Thamrin Ely: Maluku Idol Dapat Nilai 7’, 2 July.
Suara Maluku (2008c), ‘Massa Rasa Penuhi Pusat Kota, Massa Kandidat Lain Seimbang’,
7 July.
The Jakarta Post (2007), ‘Maluku govt offices burn in suspected arson attack’, 17 Janu-
ary.
Toisuta, H., et al (2007), ‘Damai … Damai di Maluku…!’ in Alpha Amirrachman et al,
eds, Revitalisasi Kearifan Lokal: Studi Resolusi Konflik di Kalimantan Barat, Maluku
dan Poso, International Centre for Islam and Pluralism, Jakarta, pp 110–201.
Tomsa, D. (2006), ‘The defeat of centralized paternalism: factionalism, assertive re-
gional cadres, and the long fall of Golkar Chairman Akbar Tandjung’, Indonesia, Vol
81 (April), pp 1–22.
Tomsa, D. (2008), Party Politics and Democratization in Indonesia: Golkar in the Post-
Suharto Era, Routledge, London and New York.
Tomsa, D. (2009), Local Elections and Party Politics in a Post-Conflict Area: The Pilkada
in Maluku, Indonesian Studies Working Papers No 8, March, University of Sydney.
Ufen, A. (2008), ‘From aliran to dealignment: political parties in post-Suharto Indone-
sia’, South East Asia Research, Vol 16, No 1, pp 5–41.
van Klinken, G. (2006), ‘The Maluku wars: “communal contenders” in a failing state’,
in Coppel, C. A., ed, Violent Conflicts in Indonesia: Analysis, Representation, Reso-
lution, Routledge, London and New York, pp 129–143.
van Klinken, G. (2007), Communal Violence and Democratization in Indonesia: Small
Town Wars, Routledge, London and New York.
van Klinken, G. (2008), ‘The limits of ethnic clientelism in Indonesia’, Review of Indo-
nesian and Malaysian Affairs, Vol 42, pp 35–65.
van Klinken, G. (2009), ‘Decolonization and the making of middle Indonesia’, Urban
Geography (in press).
Vel, J. (2005), ‘Pilkada in East Sumba: an old rivalry in a new democratic setting’, Indo-
nesia, Vol 80 (October), pp 81–107.
Vel, J. A. C. (2008), Uma Politics: An Ethnography of Democratization in West Sumba,
Indonesia, 1986–2006, KITLV Press, Leiden.
Wilson, C. (2005), Overcoming Violent Conflict: Vol. 5, Peace and Development Analy-
sis in Indonesia, CPRU-UNDP, BAPPENAS, CSPS, LabSosio and LIPI, Jakarta.
Wilson, C. (2008), Ethno-Religious Violence in Indonesia: From Soil to God, Routledge,
London and New York.
